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Abstract 
We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing 
personal resources to group decisions versus by free-riding on the contributions of other 
members.    In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear 
in  individual  contributions,  the  present  model  assumes  decreasing  marginal  group 
production  as  a  function  of  aggregate  individual  contributions.    This  diminishing 
marginal returns assumption is more realistic and generates starkly different predictions 
compared to the linear model.    One important implication is that, under most conditions, 
there exist equilibria where some, but not all members of a group contribute, even with 
completely self-interested motives.    An agent-based simulation confirms the individual 
and group advantages of the equilibria in which behavioral asymmetry emerges from a 
game structure that is a priori perfectly symmetric for all agents (all agents have the same 
payoff  function  and  action  space,  but  take  different  actions  in  equilibria).    And  a 
behavioral experiment demonstrates that cooperators and free-riders coexist in a stable 
manner in groups performing with the non-linear production function.  A collateral result 
demonstrates  that,  compared  to  a  ―dictatorial‖  decision  scheme  guided  by  the  best 
member in a group, the majority-plurality decision rules can pool information effectively 
and  produce  greater  individual  net  welfare  at  equilibrium,  even  if  free-riding  is  not 
sanctioned.    This is an original proof that cooperation in ad hoc decision-making groups 
can be understood in terms of self-interested motivations and that, despite the free-rider 
problem, majority-plurality decision rules can function robustly as simple, efficient social        Democracy Under Uncertainty      3 
 
decision heuristics. 
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Democracy Under Uncertainty: 
The “Wisdom of Crowds” and the Free-Rider Problem in Group Decision Making 
Every  human  society  relies  on  groups  to  make  important  decisions  because, 
among  other  advantages,  groups  have  more  problem-solving  resources  than  any 
individual member (e.g., Kerr & Tindale, 2004).    Indeed, there are many tasks that can 
be  achieved  only  by  a  group  effort  and  that  could  never  be  accomplished  by  one 
individual  or  by  many  individuals  working  separately.    For  example,  a  group  of 
geologists, engineers, demographers, and business executives have complementary skill 
sets that could allow them to make much more precise decisions about where to locate a 
large construction project than any one of the individuals in these groups could alone.  
Similarly, in a primitive setting, five tribesmen could cooperate to decide where to forage 
for prey much more effectively than if all worked independently. 
But,  despite  such  a  potential  for  ―collective  wisdom,‖  there  is  a  fundamental 
trade-off  between  selfish,  individualistic  goals  and  the  more  general  social  welfare.   
Participation in a group activity is often described as a sacrifice of personal utility.    Who 
hasn‘t pondered whether to ―blow-off‖ preparation for a group assignment (e.g., not to 
study  the  candidates‘  resumes  before  a  hiring  committee  meeting,  to  shirk  one‘s 
homework before a joint study committee meeting, etc.) and to ―free-ride‖ on the efforts 
of those who have fulfilled their social obligation?    Many theoretical analyses of small 
group  cooperation  conceptualize  group  enterprises  as  social  dilemmas,  and  treat 
cooperative  behavior  as  a  puzzle  (Dawes,  1980).    In  social  dilemma  situations,  the        Democracy Under Uncertainty      5 
 
personal payoff to an individual group member is always less when s/he cooperates in the 
group enterprise than it would be if s/he acted as a free rider, even though the overall 
group  welfare  is  larger  when  all  members  cooperate  than  when  nobody  cooperates.   
Consistent with the ―sacrifice theme,‖ most behavioral experiments on social dilemmas 
show  that  average  contributions  to  public  goods  deteriorate  significantly  after  a  few 
iterations if no punishment opportunity exists (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Herrmann, 
Thöni  &  Gächter, 2008;  for  reviews,  see  Camerer, 2003; Fehr  &  Fischbacher, 2003; 
Ledyard, 1995).    Even with an alternative public goods game featuring a preliminary 
binding commitment round, which produces more theoretical and empirical support for at 
least some players to make social contributions, the prevailing interpretation holds that 
cooperation is difficult to sustain (Saijo and Yamato, 1999; Cason, Saijo and Yamato, 
2002;  Cason,  Saijo,  Yamato  and  Yokotani,  2004).    And,  in  conventional  group 
production  and  problem-solving  tasks,  social  psychological  research  has  provided 
considerable evidence of social loafing (Latané, Williams & Harkins, 1979; see also Kerr 
& Tindale, 2004; Williams, Harkins & Karau, 2003 for reviews).    If members of small 
decision-making groups (e.g., juries, panels, committees) are playing such a game, the 
theory  predicts  that  cooperation  is  hard  to  sustain  without  enforcement  mechanisms.   
This  framing of  group  enterprises as  social  dilemmas  leads  to  a  pessimistic view  of 
groups as problem solvers or decision makers and implies that public goods requiring 
group cooperation will be severely under-supplied. 
The above sketch illustrates a fundamental gap between the two images of group        Democracy Under Uncertainty      6 
 
decision mechanisms – a highly intelligent device that can achieve collective wisdom 
versus a defective social process that degrades towards sub-optimal performance (Janis, 
1972).    How can we reconcile the two contrasting images?    The central puzzle is as 
follows: How can the ―wisdom of crowds‖ (Surowiecki, 2004) be sustained in face of the 
free-rider  problem?  Do  groups  require  some  policing  mechanism  that  enforces 
members‘ contributions toward group enterprises to yield collective wisdom? 
Is Group Decision Making Necessarily a Social Dilemma? 
To defend the viability of group decision processes, some social choice theorists 
have argued that people may feel good, experiencing ―expressive benefits‖ (Brennan & 
Lomasky, 1993), when they contribute to the functioning of a group (Downs, 1957) or 
when they fulfill civic duties (Meehl, 1997; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973).    Survey data 
from large-scale elections provide modest support for this view, while identifying other 
social-psychological factors as well, including social norms (Knack, 1992) and cognitive 
biases  (Opp,  2001).    Applying  this  view  to  small-group  decision  making, we  would 
expect some people to be cooperative – for example, turning out for group meetings, 
engaging  in  costly  information  search  prior  to  meetings  –  driven  by  these  prosocial 
motives. 
Although prosocial motives underlie some contributions to group enterprises, 
such an account begs questions concerning the ultimate sources of these motives (see 
Posner,  2000).    The  present  paper  proposes  an  alternative  theoretical  framework  in 
which to interpret positive contributions to group enterprises without invoking prosocial        Democracy Under Uncertainty      7 
 
motives.    After all, there must be some personal advantage to individual members in 
cases where no collection of individuals acting independently could achieve even part of 
the  group  product  that  can  be  achieved  by  the  collective.    But  even  in  tasks  where 
contributions are incremental, we argue that contrary to the social dilemma interpretation, 
cooperation  can  in  many  real-world  and  theoretical  contexts  (i.e.,  with  diminishing 
marginal group returns to individual contributions) be both self-interested and beneficial 
tothe  group.    Such  an  analysis  would  explain  the  widespread  cooperation  in  human 
societies as a function of the benefits of individual cooperation without adding any new 
prosocial  motives.    Our  argument  draws  on  a  diverse  sample  of  empirical  and 
theoretical literatures, ranging from theoretical biology to experimental economics.    We 
first analyze structures of various group tasks in natural settings, in terms of functional 
relations  between  members‘  inputs  and  group  productivity  (McGrath,  1984;  Steiner, 
1972).    We  then  discuss  the  implications  of  this  analysis  for  cooperation  in  group 
decision making. 
The ubiquity of marginally-diminishing-returns group production function 
in naturally-occurring tasks.  When a group of people collaborates to make a decision 
or to produce some other tangible good (e.g., investment committee, strategic planning 
staff,  production  line),  productivity  usually  increases  monotonically with  increases  in 
group size, at least over some range.    But the relationship often falls short of linearity.   
Although we cannot conduct a census of all group production tasks in our society, we are 
confident that the almost universal relationship between group size and productivity is        Democracy Under Uncertainty      8 
 
monotonically increasing but with marginally-diminishing returns over an appropriately 
specified range in group size.    This can be observed in many natural settings.     
The behavioral ecology literature studying animal behavior provides a useful 
starting point to see why this is the case.    Marginally-diminishing returns are common in 
many  systems  of  the  animal kingdom,  including  social vertebrates  and  social  insects 
(Foster,  2004).    For  example,  sentinel  behavior  of  many  mammals  and  birds  is  a 
collective  endeavor  with  marginally-diminishing  returns  (Trivers,  1971;  Bednekoff, 
1997).  Think of it this way: if you are camping with a group of 10 people, there are 
much larger benefits from the first and perhaps second person staying awake to warn the 
other  campers  about  approaching bears  than  there  are  from  the  9
th  and 10
th  campers 
staying awake, whose contributions generate virtually zero marginal benefits.     
To illustrate, let us denote the average probability of a single sentinel detecting 
an approaching predator as p.    Assuming that there is no process loss (Steiner, 1972), 
the  probability  that  a  group  with  n  individuals  being  on  watch  detects  the  danger 
successfully is then approximated by 1-(1-p)
n (Laughlin, 1980; Lorge & Solomon, 1955).   
This means that the group success in vigilance increases monotonically but diminishes at 
the margin, with an increase in the number of sentinels, n, in the group.    Social foraging, 
another key survival task, shares this structure.    When a flock of birds is searching for 
food, discovery of a rich food patch by a single bird results in other birds joining to 
forage in the same patch (Giraldeau & Caraco, 2000).    The group success in locating a 
rich food patch is thus approximated by the identical function, 1-(1-p)
n, where p denotes        Democracy Under Uncertainty      9 
 
the average probability of a single bird encountering a rich patch and n refers to the flock 
size  (Barnard  &  Sibly,  1981;  see  Foster,  2004,  for  other  examples  in  the  animal 
kingdom). 
Although many core everyday group-production tasks for humans also revolve 
around foraging and risk-monitoring (see Kameda & Tindale 2006 for review), ―groups‖ 
in these animal examples are surely nothing more than collections of individuals, where 
no substantial coordination activities exist.    Birds do not deliberately orchestrate their 
sentinel  or  food-searching  behavior,  and  group  performance  is  best  described  as  a 
probabilistic aggregation of individual outputs rather than the product of a systematic 
group  design  (e.g.,  group  decision  making),  which  is  more  typical  of  human  social 
coordination.     
Interestingly, however, explicit coordination efforts do not necessarily eliminate 
the marginally-diminishing nature of group production for the following reasons.    First, 
difficulties in coordination among members multiply with group size, and interpersonal 
conflicts are also likelier to occur, among other production-cutting social factors (see 
Steiner,  1972;  Thompson,  2004,  especially  Chapter  2,  for  comprehensive  reviews).   
Second and more importantly, the fundamental structure of many natural tasks mandates 
diminishing  returns  in  productivity  from  later  contributions.    When  information  is 
redundant or task-relevant skills overlap from member to member, diminishing returns 
are inevitable even with perfect coordination (Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Makradakis & 
Winkler, 1983); and when any task is not perfectly divisible into independent sub-tasks,        Democracy Under Uncertainty      10 
 
individual  performances  must  be  somewhat  redundant,  producing  diminishing 
productivity as more individuals are added to the collective enterprise. 
For example, consider group judgments that rely on information aggregation, 
which  represents  an  essential  sub-task  in  group  performance  (McGrath,  1984).   
Members collectively estimate a quantity, such as the future price of a stock.    Let us 
presume  that  the  group  estimate  is  approximated  by  the  arithmetic  mean,  or  simple 
average, of the individual estimates, which is a valid description of many behavioral 
judgment  aggregation  processes  (see  Clemen  &  Winkler,  1999;  Hastie,  1986;  Kerr, 
MacCoun,  &  Kramer,  1996,  for  review).    Furthermore,  if  individual  estimates  have 
equal  signal-to-noise  ratios  and  vary  around  the  true  value  of  the  stock  price  with 
uncorrelated random errors, the arithmetic mean is a statistically optimal aggregation rule 
(Larrick & Soll, 2006; Surowiecki, 2004).    For an average computed from a randomly 
drawn sample, the law of large numbers tells us the group estimate should converge on 
the true value, and well-known calculations of the variance of the arithmetic mean show 
explicitly  that  the  precision  of  this  group  estimate  improves  with  each  additional 
observation (i.e., an individual‘s judgment in the present example).    The reduction in 












, is greater than zero, where σ
2 is the variance of the individual 
estimates.    But note the marginal improvements in the aggregate estimate (in terms of 
smaller random deviations from the true value) diminish with increasing group size, n 
(see Condorcet, 1785/1994, for an analogous proof when the judgment is categorical, e.g.,        Democracy Under Uncertainty      11 
 
between political candidates). 
Indeed, if we turn to classic analyses of group performance and productivity in 
social psychology (McGrath, 1982; Steiner, 1972), we find that many abstract task types 
imply  that  group  performance  indices  (amount  of  goods  produced,  time  to  produce, 
accuracy of estimates) will be related to group size with a monotonically increasing but 
marginally diminishing returns function.    This includes decisions based on unanimous, 
majority,  and  truth-wins  group  decision  rules  (see  Condorcet  1785/1994;  Smoke  & 
Zajonc, 1962); disjunctive tasks (Steiner, 1972) where a success of only one member is 
sufficient to achieve a collective goal (e.g., risk-monitoring, resource-finding, and other 
―Eureka problems‖: see Kameda & Tamura, 2007; Laughlin, 1980; Lorge & Solomon, 
1955; Taylor & Faust, 1952); and additive tasks (Steiner, 1972) where members‘ inputs 
are  summed  to  determine  an  overall  group  performance  (e.g.,  group  estimation  by 
averaging, physical  tasks as  exemplified by a tug of war: see Hastie, 1986;  Ingham, 
Levinger,  Graves  &  Peckham,  1974;  Kravitz  &  Martin  1986).    The  only  clear 
exceptions to this generalization are conjunctive tasks (Steiner, 1972) where the ―weakest 
link‖ member determines the overall group performance and more members mean poorer 
performance,  and  synergistic  tasks  where  the  group  production  function  would  be 
positively accelerated.    We know of no examples of the deliberate use of groups to solve 
conjunctive tasks (unless institutional or situational constraints impose conjunctive task 
demands) and we know of very few examples of verified synergistic group performances 
in the scientific literature (see Larson 2009 for a recent comprehensive review).        Democracy Under Uncertainty      12 
 
In summary, a marginally-diminishing group production function seems to apply 
in  many  group  performance  domains  in  natural  settings.    Perhaps  because  of  the 
mathematical  convenience  of  the  linear  group  production  function,  this  widespread 
diminishing marginal returns feature is conspicuously missing from most of the group 
performance and public goods literatures (see also Kerr 1983 for one of early attempts to 
link group performance with social dilemmas).    The linear public goods model assumes 
that each individual‘s contribution yields a constant return for the group, and the return, 
which  is  shared  evenly  by  all  members,  is  less  than  individual  cost  of  cooperation, 
regardless  of  the  number  of  other  contributors.    This  implies  the  overly  pessimistic 
prediction that we should almost never expect to see contributors to public goods because, 
at all levels of inputs in the group production function, defection is the dominant strategy 
(Ledyard, 1995; but see Laury & Holt, 2008).
１ 
Emergence  of  a  mixed  equilibrium.  Given  a  marginally-diminishing 
production function, is defection still the dominant strategy?    The answer turns out to be 
not necessarily.    A theoretical biologist, Motro (1991), concerned with abstract foraging 
problems, has provided a general powerful framework in which to analyze this question. 
Let us suppose that we have a six-person group and that the group production function 
(e.g., mapping the number of contributors who search for food into the expected quantity 
of food available for each member of the group, humans, non-human animals, robots, 
etc.) takes a marginally diminishing form as shown in Figure 1.    As in social dilemmas, 
we assume the group production benefit is shared equally by all group members, but that        Democracy Under Uncertainty      13 
 
production  costs  are  borne  by  each  producing  or  contributing  member  individually 
(Dawes, 1980; Kameda, Takezawa, & Hastie, 2003).    The x-axis represents the number 
of cooperators, while the y-axis represents the expected gross return to each member of 
the  group  (group  gross  return  /  6).    ―Gross‖  refers  to  the  fact  that  the  costs  of 
contributing are not yet represented in Figure 1.    The production function‘s concave 
increasing  form  generates  marginal  returns  to  individual  contributions  to  the  group, 
labeled δn when the number of cooperators increases from  n to n+1, that are indeed 
diminishing as more individuals contribute. 
Motro (1991) analytically identified an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in 
this situation: Cooperate as long as the increment, δ, exceeds individual cost (denoted c), 
but  switch  to  defection  otherwise.
２  In other words, keep cooperating while your 
contribution yields an individually positive expected net return.    Note that, even when 
the increment δ representing the marginal individual return to contributing is too small to 
justify the cost to contribute for an individual, additional contribution by the individual 
may still be beneficial to the entire group (i.e., while the marginal individual return, δm, 
by joining m other cooperators in the group is less than individual cost, c, aggregate 
group return, 6*δm, may still be greater than the individual cost).    This means that, as in 
linear social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980), each individual‘s rational action may lead to the 
inefficient level of contributions at the group level (―Pareto inefficient‖).    However, in 
the nonlinear case depicted in Figure 1, δ is not constant but is a function of the number 
of  cooperators.    As  long  as  c  < δn  for  some  small  n,  the  model  predicts  that  some        Democracy Under Uncertainty      14 
 
members  in  the  group  will  contribute/cooperate;  in  other  words,  the  important 
implication of diminishing returns in this empirically more realistic group production 
function is that defection is no longer a universally (i.e., over the entire range of number 
of  cooperators)  dominant  strategy.    Thus,  many  naturally-occurring  tasks  with 
marginally-diminishing return curves do not necessarily constitute social dilemmas. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 – ILLUSTRATION OF A MARGINALLY-DIMINISHING 
RETURN CURVE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 re-expresses the production function from Figure 1 as a net (individual 
gross return – cost) payoff function for a cooperator (solid curve), and as a net payoff 
function for a defector (dashed curve), both expressed as functions of the number of other 
group members who contribute (individual cooperation cost was fixed at 0.7 in Figure 2).   
Note  that  the  two  curves  intersect  at  an  equilibrium,  specifying  the  number  that  is 
predicted by the theory of Nash Equilibrium of rationally self-interested cooperators in 
the  group.    As  can  be  seen  in  the  figure,  an  individual  is  personally  better  off 
cooperating  when  there  are  few  cooperators,  and better  off  defecting when  there  are 
already  several  cooperators  among  the  other  group  members.    The  net  benefits  of 
cooperating or defecting depends on the frequency of the alternative strategy within the 
group; neither strategy is dominant (Laury & Holt, 2008).    Too many players opting for 
one  strategy  reduces  its  relative  profitability  while  increasing  the  profitability  of  its        Democracy Under Uncertainty      15 
 
alternative, providing an incentive for individuals to switch.  Since the two strategies are 
mutually constrained in terms of relative profitability, we expect a mixed equilibrium to 
emerge  (Gintis,  2000;  Maynard  Smith,  1982).    At  equilibrium,  the  group  reaches  a 
stable state in which complementary proportions of cooperators and defectors coexist, 
achieving  an  average  frequency  of  cooperators  given  by  the  point  at  which  the  two 
individual net payoff curves intersect.    In Figure 2, the two curves intersect when the 
number of other cooperators is between 1 and 2, which predicts 2 cooperators and 4 
defectors on average in the group with the illustrative costs and benefits of cooperation in 
this example.   
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 – EXPECTED INDIVIDUAL NET PAYOFFS (INDIDUAL GROSS 
RETURN – COST) 
--------------------------------------------- 
Group Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
Motro‘s (1991) model provides a powerful theoretical benchmark to re-consider 
realistic cooperation levels in group performance and public goods provision (Kerr, 1983; 
Laury & Holt, 2008).    We apply this model to a stylized group decision situation, which 
constitutes a core group-production task in everyday life.    We have two goals in this 
paper:  (1)  to  examine  the  degree  to  which  Motro‘s  framework  captures  members‘ 
cooperation for the group enterprise, and (2) to examine the effects of various voting        Democracy Under Uncertainty      16 
 
rules  (e.g.,  Majority/Plurality,  Best  Member  Rule)  on  the  quality  of  group  decision 
outcomes when free-riding is possible. 
Applicability of Motro’s model to group decision making.  Suppose that a 
group of six members needs to select a single location in which they will search together 
for  food.  Each  member  decides  whether  to  ―cooperate‖  (produce)  by  seeking 
decision-relevant information, an activity with some personal costs; or to free-ride (defect, 
scrounge) on the decisions of the other members.    Obviously, if no member decides to 
seek information, the group decision will be uninformed and far from optimal.    But, it is 
also true that, if all members seek information, there will be redundancy and a loss of 
potential production value.    Motro (1991) proved that it is wasteful for all individuals to 
seek  information  precisely  because  of  the  diminishing  marginal  returns  of  the  group 
production function.    We apply this logic to group decision making under uncertainty, 
where the objective value of a choice alternative, or ―truth‖ (Laughlin, 1980), must be 
inferred  through  imperfect  stochastic  information.  We  predict  that  group  decision 
making under uncertainty, which forms the core of modern committee meetings as well 
as ―primordial‖ team foraging, would yield a mixed equilibrium in which cooperators and 
free-riders coexist, rather than the all-defect equilibrium in social dilemmas (with the 
unrealistic  linear-additive  production  function;  see  also  footnote  1).  An  equilibrium 
mixture of cooperators and defectors will be determined by the Motro function. 
Robustness  of  majority/plurality  group  decision  rule.  Although  the 
argument so far has depicted group decision making as if it were a uniform concept,        Democracy Under Uncertainty      17 
 
each group decision setting entails specific design features.    Even if we limit our focus 
to ―consensual‖ decision making (e.g., juries, committees, panels), there are numerous 
variations about how to implement the group decision system.    This includes choices of 
quorum rules, polling procedures, aggregation rules, and so on (e.g., Hastie, Penrod & 
Pennington, 1983; Kameda, Tindale, & Davis, 2003; Regenwetter, Grofman, Marley & 
Tsetlin, 2006).    How do these design features affect members‘ cooperation levels and 
consequentially determine the quality of final group decision outcomes?    In this paper, 
we test whether the Majority/Plurality rule, whereby the option in the group‘s choice set 
with the most votes becomes the group‘s final choice, can sustain members‘ cooperation 
and serve as a robust truth-seeking decision procedure in uncertain environments (Hastie 
& Kameda, 2005; Sorkin, Hays & West, 2001).     
Using computer simulations and a behavioral experiment, Hastie and Kameda 
(2005)  evaluated  various  group  decision  rules  based  on  their  adaptive  accuracy  in 
choosing the mutually most beneficial alternative in an uncertain, simulated test bed 
environment.    These  aggregation  rules  included  Averaging,  the  Best  Member  Rule, 
Condorcet  Majority,  Majority/Plurality,  and  so  on  (see  Hastie  &  Kameda,  2005  for 
details).    When  the  adaptive  success  standard  is  applied  to  evaluate  the  rules 
(Hammond & Stewart, 2001; Hastie, 1986; Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research 
Group,  1999),  the  Majority/Plurality  rule  fares  quite  well,  performing  at  levels 
comparable to much more  cognitively-taxing rules such as  the averaging rule.    The 
Majority/Plurality rule also matches the computationally demanding Condorcet Majority 
Winner that is the common standard in evaluations of preferential choice rules (Arrow,        Democracy Under Uncertainty      18 
 
1951; Mueller, 2003; Regenwetter, Ho & Tsetlin, 2007).    These results indicate that, 
despite its computational simplicity, the Majority/Plurality rule can achieve surprisingly 
high levels of performance under uncertainty. 
  In  these  previous  studies,  however,  it  was  assumed  that  everybody  would 
cooperate to support the group enterprise (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Sorkin et al., 2001).   
Thus, it is an open question, whether the Majority/Plurality rule would be theoretically 
and  behaviorally  successful  when  there  is  a  personal  cost  to  be  an  informed  voter.  
Several  key  questions  in  the  present  research  concern  the  performance  of  the 
Majority/Plurality  rule  under  more  realistic  assumptions  about  the  group  production 
function and individual cooperation costs.  If a mixed equilibrium holds (Motro, 1991), 
how efficient is the productivity at the equilibrium under the Majority/Plurality group 
decision  rule?    Does  the  Majority/Plurality  rule  degrade  into  a  universal  free-riding 
―tragedy of the commons‖ situation where decisions are made by uninformed voters 
(Downs, 1957; Mueller, 2003)?    How does it compare with the group outcome guided 
by the best and brightest ―benevolent dictator‖ in a group – a logically coherent decision 
system  that  has  been  pitted  against  democratic  rules  in  the  social  choice  literature 
(Arrow,  1951;  Laughlin,  2006)  and  a  solution  that  is  selected  in  some 
naturally-occurring human groups? 
In  the  following,  we  first  report  on  an  evolutionary  computer  simulation 
(Kameda et al., 2003; Smith & Conrey, 2007; Kenrick, Li & Butner, 2003) to determine if 
there is a mixed equilibrium in a ―group-foraging‖ task with significant and stable levels 
of cooperation under different group decision rules, and then compare adaptive success of        Democracy Under Uncertainty      19 
 
the  different  decision  rules  at  respective  equilibria.    Next,  we  report  a  behavioral 
experiment that implements a group foraging task under uncertainty in an interactive 
laboratory set-up.    In both cases, individuals (computer agents in the simulation study 
and human participants in the behavioral experiment) were required to decide whether to 
cooperate or defect before voting on a foraging location. 
EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTER SIMULATION 
Overview 
We rely on an evolutionary simulation model based on Darwinian logic to explore 
the implications of the diminishing group returns model and to evaluate the theoretical 
viability of a Majority/Plurality group decision rule when informed participation in the 
decision is individually costly.    In the evolutionary simulation, we first specify a set of 
behavioral strategies, and then let them interact in the same population (e.g., Axelrod, 
1984; Gintis, 2000; Kameda et al., 2003).  The strategies are defined in terms of the 
basic cooperate (at personal cost) versus defect (at no personal cost) distinction.  The 
Darwinian  logic  dictates  that  more  successful  strategies  in  the  current  population 
reproduce at higher rates for the next generation, analogous to biological evolution in an 
ecological  niche.    In  social  scientific  applications,  such  changes  are  not  necessarily 
evolutionary  but  may  reflect,  most  notably,  social  imitative  learning  of  successful 
strategies  in  a  group  (Gintis,  2000).  We  observe  whether  such  a  change  in  the 
population structure leads to a stable collective state where the population is dominated 
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end state is called an evolutionary equilibrium (Gintis, 2000; Maynard Smith, 1982). 
In the following simulations, we formulate four behavioral strategies in terms of 
the basic distinction between cooperating (at a personal cost) versus defecting (at no 
personal cost):    (a) whether to pay a cost to acquire the information needed to make 
well-informed  individual  judgments,  and  (b)  whether  to  pay  a  cost  in  order  to  vote.  
Individual cooperation (information search and voting) can increase the quality of group 
decisions and thus enhance overall group return, but it entails a personal cost as well, 
which presents a dilemma for the agent in deciding at what level to take part in collective 
action. 
Given  such  a  dilemma,  it  seems  that  uncooperative  members  are  unilaterally 
better off than cooperative members, and we might expect them eventually to dominate 
the  population,  which  would  yield  an  all-defect  equilibrium.    But  based  on  Motro‘s 
model (1991), we posit that a mixed equilibrium will emerge, where both cooperative and 
uncooperative  individuals  coexist  in  the  population.  We  test  this  prediction  in  two 
populations governed by contrasting decision rules: the Majority/Plurality Rule (based on 
the  winner  with  the  most  votes  in  a  one-member-one-vote  election)  versus  the 
Best-Member Rule (where the member with the best long-term ability/accuracy dictates 
the  choice).    As  a  benchmark,  we  also  examine  a  population  operating  with  the 
Random-Member  Rule  (where  a  randomly-chosen  member  dictates  the  choice  to  the 
other members) as in Hastie & Kameda (2005).     
If a mixed equilibrium indeed emerges for each population as predicted by the        Democracy Under Uncertainty      21 
 
model, we will consider our second question: Does the Majority/Plurality Rule produce 
better outcomes in terms of individual net benefit than the Best-Member Rule at the 
respective equilibrium in each population?  Is the ―wisdom of crowds‖ sustained over 
time  or  does  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule  unravel  into  a  free-riding  world  in  which 
decisions are made predominantly by uninformed voters? 
Simulation Method 
Simulation platform 
To illustrate the basic features of our simulation, we rely on the metaphor of a 
primitive forager seeking resources at locations in an uncertain physical environment (see 
Hastie & Kameda, 2005, for more details on the procedure).    This task represents the 
essential features of a general decision problem faced by any organism: Which option 
among  a  set  of  alternatives  to  choose,  given  noisy  information  about  the  payoff 
contingent on choosing each option.    The simulation world has two major components, 
environmental events, namely the amounts of reward (gain or loss) available at various 
locations,  and  foragers  whose  fitness  depends  on  accurate  judgments  of  the 
environmental  events  (see  Figure  3).    The  state  of  an  environmental  event  (reward 
available) is known probabilistically to foragers through proximal, partially valid cues 
(i.e., a noisy cue is the true value plus a white-noise error term).    Thus, each individual 
faces the adaptive task of aggregating the information contained in these noisy cues to 
infer  whether  environmental  locations  are  rewarding  or  punishing.    The  individual 
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framework for perception and judgment (Brunswik, 1955; Cooksey, 1998; Hammond & 
Stewart, 2001; Gigerenzer et al., 1999). 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 - STRUCTURE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
-------------------------------------- 
Structure  of  the  environment.  In  the  simulation,  we  set  up  the  stochastic 
features of environmental events as follows.    Let j index one of 10 possible foraging 
locations, j  ∈{1, 2, …, 10}.    To represent the true value of the food available at each of 
these 10 locations, we generated random numbers from a normal distribution N(0, 30) 
denoted, Qj (we refer to this quantity as the ―payoff‖ in this paper).    Motivation for the 
units used (e.g., standard deviation equal to 30) is discussed below.    These true values, 
however, cannot be directly known; information about each of the 10 values represented 
by  Qj  is  available  in  three  noisy  cues.    These  cues  were  generated  by  taking  each 
location‘s true resource value, Qj, and adding normally distributed error to it, creating a 
cue value composed of true value + error.    The normally distributed error terms were 
specified with standard deviations of 10, 20, and 30.    Therefore, the cues, denoted (C1, 
C2, C3), differed in validity as predictors of the true value of each patch, with validities of 
0.90, 0.69, and 0.50, respectively, on a proportion-of-variance-accounted-for metric (i.e., 
R-squared).    As shown in the left portion of Figure 3, the optimal linear combination of 
these cues for estimation (explaining 92% of the variance of Qj) was: 
E[Qj |C1,C2,C3] = 0.68C1+0.17C2+0.08C3 .        (1)        Democracy Under Uncertainty      23 
 
Foragers.    As evident from the discussion above, the adaptive goal for each 
individual ―forager‖ is to combine the cues, in the same manner as the optimal linear 
combination rule, to yield an estimate for value of the payoff (i.e., ―expected nutritional 
value‖) available at each location.    Such an individual estimation process,  which we 
refer to as a judgment policy (Brunswik, 1955; Hammond & Stewart, 2001), can be 
represented by how the person weights the three proximal cues to form an estimate.   
Our simulation implemented this feature by assigning judgment policies to foragers at 
random as follows (see the right portion of Figure 3).     
Member i‘s estimation of location j‘s value is expressed (i = member, j = location, 
and k = cue): 
estimated Qij  =    wi.1Cij1 + wi.2Cij2 + wi.3Cij3    (2) 
where wi.1 is the weight forager i gives to his or her perception of Cue 1 for location j, 
denoted Cij1.  The model allows agents to experience perceptual errors.    In other words, 
cue values are not usually perceived veridically and different judges make different errors.  
Each  perceived  cue  value,  Cijk,  has  two  components:  a  true  cue  value  (C.jk)  that  is 
common  to  all  members,  plus  an  environmental-perceptual  error  (eijk),  associated 
uniquely  with  each  member  i‘s  perception  of  the  cue  ( ijk jk ijk e C C   . ).    The  error 
component, eijk, is generated randomly from N(0, 20).     
We relied on Dawes‘ (1979; also Brehmer & Joyce, 1988, and Anderson, 1981) 
observation that, in judgment tasks such as the one in our simulations, people appear to 
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1), people judge as though they rely on approximate weights and often on equal weights, 
getting the predictive ―direction‖ right, but only approximating relative cue importance.   
(Dawes [1979] also demonstrated that such ―improper linear models‖ achieve levels of 
accuracy  comparable  to  optimal  linear aggregation  rules  in  many  situations;  see  also 
Gigerenzer, et al., 1999, for analyses of other simplified estimation rules). 
Dawes‘ (1979) conclusion implies that most people would weight the three cues 
approximately equally in aggregation.    Based on this reasoning, our simulation used the 
following procedure in the implementation of wi.k.    For each member of each foraging 
group, we generated three random numbers once and then standardized them so that their 
sum equaled 1.    The standardized fractions determined the member‘s judgment policy 
which  remained  identical  throughout  the  group‘s  100  ―hunts‖.    Thus,  the  modal 
judgment policy under this procedure is equal cue weighting, (.33, .33, .33), but there is 
considerable variation in individual cue weighting policies.    The important point is that 
a modal forager‘s estimates in the basic simulation are not statistically optimal (see Eq. 1), 
but on average are based on equal cue weights. 
Behavioral strategies of the foragers 
Members‘  judgment  policies  for  cue-weighting  were  the  only  individual 
differences that Hastie and Kameda (2005) considered in their simulation platform; these 
are  cognitive  differences  among  members.    To  address  the  issue  of  the  free-rider 
problem  in  group  decision-making,  the  current  simulation  introduced  members‘ 
motivational differences for cooperation as a key element in the evolutionary algorithm.   
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group decision-making (Downs, 1957; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973): (a) whether to accept 
the information search cost to make well-informed individual judgments (Lupia, 2002; 
Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002, 2003), and (b) whether to bear  the cost of participating 
(voting) in group meetings (Knack, 1992).    As shown in Table 1, each dimension had 
two behavioral options, creating four ―genotypes‖.     
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 – FOUR BEHAVIORAL STRATEGIES 
-------------------------------------- 
For the search dimension, some agents engage in individual information search 
about the environment and personally incur some cost (a simulation parameter to be 
varied systematically) to obtain that information.    These ―searchers‖ have access to the 
environmental cues in all ten locations (Figure 3) and combine them according to their 
judgment policies.    Other agents (―non-searchers‖) skip information search to avoid the 
search cost.    Accordingly, they have no cue information to inform their judgments, and 
if non-searchers ―vote‖ (see below), they endorse one alternative randomly (essentially 
introducing ―noise‖ into the group decision).    As in many public goods situations, group 
payoffs are equally available to all irrespective of members‘ cooperation levels. 
We  quickly discovered, however, that only two of the  four original strategies 
could  survive  at  the  equilibrium:  searcher/voter  hybrids  and  non-searcher/abstainer 
hybrids.    The other two hybrids, searcher/abstainer and non-searcher/voter, disappeared 
in the course of Darwinian selection.    These two hybrids are ―evolutionarily irrational‖        Democracy Under Uncertainty      26 
 
behavioral choices in this model in that they cannot sustain themselves (searchers who 
abstain  from  voting  harm  themselves  by  wasting  resources  expended  on  information 
search, while non-searchers who vote also harm themselves by degrading the accuracy of 
group decisions in terms of average payoff).  Thus, we collapsed the 2 x 2 system of 
genotypes  into  a  dichotomous  cooperator  (producer)  versus  defector  (scrounger) 
classification, which we use from now on in reporting the results of the simulation study.   
(In  the  behavioral  experiment  to  be  reported  subsequently,  it  remains  an  empirical 
question what frequencies of these four behavioral genotypes will be observed.) 
These strategies were subject to evolutionary selection in the simulation in that 
the prevalence of each genotype in the population was adjusted over time based on the 
behavioral payoffs that they received in the past; more successful strategies reproduced at 
a higher rate in later generations.
３ 
Evolutionary algorithm 
The evolutionary algorithm is summarized in Figure 4.    For illustration, let us 
consider a population governed by the Majority/Plurality Rule.    For each simulation run, 
we started with an equal probability (0.50) that any member would be assigned to one of 
the  two  behavioral  strategies.    Next,  12-person  teams  were  formed  by  randomly 
selecting  individuals  of  various  genotypes.  Using  the  metaphor  of  foraging,  this 
twelve-person team goes on a ―hunt‖ together. 
-------------------------------------- 
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-------------------------------------- 
For  each  hunt,  members  behave  according  to  their  assigned  strategies.    The 
group members are first provided an opportunity to acquire information about the current 
environment.    Searcher/voters engage in individual learning of the three cues for each of 
ten locations at some personal cost which was assumed to be constant across foragers 
(cost was varied as a simulation parameter).    They rely on these three cues to choose the 
best  alternative  based  on  their  judgment  policies  (Figure  3;  see  also  footnote  3).   
Non-searcher/abstainers skip the individual learning, avoid the cost, and do not vote or 
otherwise influence the group decision. 
Searcher/voters‘  opinions  are  then  aggregated  by  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule; 
selecting the location endorsed by the greatest number of voters in the meeting.    In case 
of a tie, one of the alternatives (of those endorsed by at least one voter) is selected at 
random.    Payoff accruing from the group‘s collective choice (i.e., the payoff available in 
the chosen patch) is equally shared among all members, whereas the corresponding costs 
are subtracted from the shares for the cooperative searcher/voters. 
The group repeats the same process for 100 different hunts in a new environment 
on each hunt.    The entire routine runs for 10,000 12-member groups, based upon which 
we calculated the mean net benefit (fitness) for each of the two strategies, by collapsing 
their net behavioral outcomes  (individual gross return  –  cost) over 1,000,000 (100 x 
10,000) trials. 
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more  fit  strategies  produce  slightly  more  offspring  for  the  next  generation.    We 
formulated  the  selection  mechanism  by  a  standard  numerical  technique  called  the 
replicator dynamic (see Gintis, 2000).    In the replicator dynamic, a strategy associated 
with  a  fitness  greater  than  the  average  fitness  in  the  current  generation  increases  in 
frequency in the next generation, while a strategy associated with a fitness less than the 
average  decreases  (see  Appendix  A  for  details).    Using  this  idealized  evolutionary 
process, we observed adjustments in the population strategy structure over generations. 
The simulation repeated the above steps for many generations until an equilibrium 
state  emerged  in  the population.    The  equilibrium  refers  to a  state  where  no  further 
changes occur in the distribution of strategies in the population.    In the simulation, we 
terminated  iterations  when  changes  in  proportions  of  the  strategies  between  two 
consecutive generations dropped below .0001. 
As noted, we created three types of populations (―societies‖), one governed by the 
Majority/Plurality  Rule;  one  governed  by  a  Best-Member  Rule,  where  the  most 
competent member (i.e., the member whose judgment policy was closest to the optimal 
weighting) among the searcher/voters in each group was initially designated the leader 
and  made  the  decisions  for  the  subsequent  100  hunts,  and  the  other  governed  by  a 
Random-Member Rule, where one searcher/voter in each group was initially selected at 
random  and  made  decisions  for  the  100  hunts.  For  each  of  the  three  decision  rule 
societies respectively, we conducted separate simulation runs to see if an equilibrium 
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three  societies  (governed  by  different  decision-making  rules)  in  terms  of  average 
individual net benefits (―individual fitness‖). 
Simulation Results and Discussion 
Emergence of a mixed equilibrium over time 
We systematically varied the cost parameters for cooperation (cost parameters for 
information  search  and  voting)  and  the  number-of-resource-locations  parameter.    We 
fixed the group size at 12 throughout the simulation runs.  Figure 5 displays equilibrium 
proportions of the two viable strategies (searcher/voters versus non-searcher/abstainers) 
in  each  population  (Majority/Plurality  Rule,  Best-Member  Rule,  or  Random-Member 
Rule), as a function of the total cooperation cost (the figure shows simulation results 
when the number of resource locations was set at 10; later we will show results from a 
sensitivity analysis where the two parameters were varied simultaneously). 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 5 – EQUILIBRIUM PROPORTIONS OF THE STRATEGIES   
-------------------------------------- 
As expected, a mixed equilibrium emerged in each of the three societies.    For 
example, when the cooperation cost was set at 0.03, 45% were cooperative searcher/voter 
hybrids  in  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule  population,  39%  in  the  Best-Member  Rule 
population,  and  35%  in  the  Random-Member  Rule  population.
４  Rather than being 
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searcher/voter hybrids sustained themselves in a stable manner.  These results support 
our  hypothesis  that  cooperation  in  group  decision-making  under  uncertainty  can  be 
conceptualized as a game where a mixed equilibrium exists (Motro, 1991; Laury & Holt, 
2008). 
Individual net benefits 
Given the emergence of the mixed equilibrium, we can address our nextl question:   
Does  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule  produce  better  results  for  individuals  in  terms  of 
average net benefits than the Best-Member Rule, when incentives for free-riding exist?   
Figure 6 displays individual net benefits (individual gross return – cost) at the respective 
equilibriums in the three societies, as a function of total cooperation cost.     
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 6 – INDVIDUAL NET PAYOFF AT THE EQUILIBRIUM 
-------------------------------------- 
Individuals in the Majority/Plurality Rule population were better off than those in 
the  Best-Member  Rule  population,  who  were  substantially  better  off  than  the 
Random-Member  Rule  population,  for  the  parameter  range  displayed  in  Figure  6.   
However, notice also that the difference in net benefits between the two key populations 
decreased as the cooperation costs increased.    This suggests that the superiority of the 
Majority/Plurality Rule over the Best-Member Rule may be eliminated and even reversed 
when cooperation costs are high.    Indeed, this was the case in all the simulations we ran.          Democracy Under Uncertainty      31 
 
When the cooperation cost was 0.27 or higher (see footnote 4), the relative standings of 
the two rules were reversed [these points are not displayed in Figure 6 to simplify the 
graphic representation].     
How  can  we  interpret  these  patterns?  A  close  inspection  of  the  equilibrium 
proportions of cooperative and  defecting individuals in the population (see Figure 5) 
provides some insights.    Figure 5 shows that the proportions of searcher/voter hybrids 
decreased  monotonically  with  a  higher  cooperation-cost.    For  example,  in  the 
Majority/Plurality Rule population, the proportion of the cooperative individuals dropped 
to 27% when the cost was 0.15 (on the right side of the diagram).    This implies that, 
with the increase in cooperation cost, the average frequency of searcher/voter hybrids 
(cooperators) in each 12-person group could eventually fall below three (≈ 12 x 0.27).   
Notice that three is the minimum number of voters for the Majority/Plurality Rule to be 
meaningfully compared with the Best-Member Rule and other group decision processes, 
as if the frequency of voters is less than three, no majority/plurality can be defined among 
the voters, except for the theoretically trivial case of perfect agreement.    In other words, 
when  the  cooperation  cost  is  high,  searcher/voter  hybrids  become  so  rare  that  most 
decision-making  groups  fail  to  assemble  the  critical  voter-quorum  (three).    In  these 
circumstances, the Best-Member Rule beats the ―indecisive‖ Majority/Plurality Rule. 
Sensitivity analysis 
In  order  to  see  how  robust  these  findings  were,  we  conducted  a  sensitivity 
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the cooperation costs (from 0.03 to 0.27), with group size held constant at 12.    A mixed 
equilibrium, as we observed in Figure 5, emerged for all combinations of these parameter 
values.    Given this, we only report relative standings of the Majority/Plurality Rule to 
the Best-Member Rule in terms of individual net payoffs at the respective equilibria.   
Figure  7  displays  differences  in  individual  net  benefits  between  the  two  populations 
(Majority/Plurality Rule minus Best-Member Rule) as a joint function of the cooperation 
costs  and  the  number  of  alternatives.    In  the  iceberg-shaped  surface,  the  unshaded 
(―above water‖) regions refer to parametric combinations where the Majority/Plurality 
Rule outperformed the  Best-Member Rule (i.e., the net benefits  difference score was 
greater than zero), and the shaded (―underwater‖) regions refer to the reverse situation. 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 7 – SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS   
-------------------------------------- 
First, as we saw in Figure 6, the relative advantage of the Majority/Plurality Rule 
over the Best-Member Rule decreased monotonically, and was eventually reversed with 
higher cooperation costs (represented on the x-axis).    As the cooperation costs increased, 
the  equilibrium  proportion  of  searcher/voter  hybrids  in  the  population  decreased  and 
groups  operating  with  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule  could  rarely  assemble  3  voters.  
Second, the Majority/Plurality Rule was more successful with greater numbers of choice 
alternatives (the second abscissa).    As can be seen in the figure, the unshaded regions in 
the graph, where the Majority/Plurality Rule outperformed the Best-Member Rule, were        Democracy Under Uncertainty      33 
 
larger with more locations (in general, more elements in the group‘s choice set).   
  To summarize, the sensitivity analysis demonstrated that the Majority/Plurality 
Rule was more successful than the Best-Member Rule when the cooperation cost was 
small and when there were more locations (i.e., choice-alternatives in the group‘s choice 
set).    (Of course, if cooperation costs are extremely high, no one will cooperate and all 
decision rules will perform at equally low levels.)    These results suggest that, despite the 
inherent  free-rider  problems  in  group  decision  making,  there  exist  large  parametric 
regions  where  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule  is  successful  in  an uncertain game  against 
nature. 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 
The next step is to see how these theoretical results fare as hypotheses about the 
behavior of human decision-making groups.    For this purpose, we designed a laboratory 
task where we could compare the performance of the Majority/Plurality Rule and the 
Best-Member  Rule,  while  measuring  each  member‘s  cooperation  during  the 
decision-making  process.    Based  on  the  simulation  results,  we  predict:  (a)  that 
participants will be divided into one of the two behavioral types, searcher/voter hybrids 
(cooperators) or non-searcher/abstainer (defectors) hybrids, and (b) that the proportions 
of these two types of members will stabilize over time, consistent with the expectation of 
a mixed equilibrium.  We also predict (c) that groups governed by Majority/Plurality 
Rule  will  be  better  off  than  those  governed  by  the  Best-Member  Rule  in  terms  of 
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parameter-dependent (Figure 7); our aim is to provide an empirical demonstration (or an 
―existence  proof‖)  of  one  case  where  majoritarian  decision  rule  works  well  under 
uncertainty in face of the free-rider problem.   
Method 
Participants 
Participants  were  180  undergraduate  students  (127  males  and  53  females) 
enrolled in introductory psychology classes at Hokkaido University.     
Group Decision Task 
We implemented a hunting-under-uncertainty task through a Local Area Network 
in a behavioral laboratory.    We told participants that they were members of six-person 
teams that must choose one of ten locations in which to hunt (instead of 12-person groups 
assumed in the simulation, we used 6-person groups in the experiment due to practical 
constraints).    Resource  levels  (e.g.,  prey  values)  in  each  location  were  generated 
randomly  from  a  normal  distribution  N(80,  30)  [unit  =  1 yen].    The  resource  levels 
could only be estimated on the basis of three stochastic cues that differed in predictive 
validity and ―perceptual errors,‖ analogous to the model in the previous section.  The 
parametric set-ups for the cue structure and the perception errors were identical to those 
used in the simulation reported here in Figure 3.
５ 
The group decision task was to select the most profitable location, using either the 
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group at the outset.    Participants‘ rewards were made contingent upon their performance 
in the hunts.  Specifically, resources in the chosen patch were divided evenly among all 
six members, although cooperative members (who engaged in information search and/or 
voting) incurred personal costs, which were subtracted from their individual accounts. 
Procedure 
Six participants were randomly assigned to one of two decision-rule conditions 
(Majority/Plurality or Best-Member), in experimental sessions lasting approximately one 
hour.  There were 15 groups (90 participants) in each condition.  Upon arrival, each 
participant  was  seated  in  a  private  cubicle  and  received  instructions  individually  via 
computer displays.    After the hunting-under-uncertainty task was explained, participants 
were  provided  an  opportunity  to  familiarize  themselves  about  how  to  use  the  three 
stochastic cues (see Figure 3 for the cue structure), displayed on the screen for each of the 
ten locations.    For 20 practice trials, each participant made personal judgments as to the 
most profitable location out of ten alternatives.    On each of the 20 practice trials, they 
received feedback about their choice success, in terms of the discrepancy in resource 
levels  between  the  chosen  location  and  the  most  profitable  one  (the  most  profitable 
location was also identified on the screen).    Because this was a practice session, all the 
judgments in this phase were individual, without reward. 
Majority/Plurality  Rule  versus  Best-Member  Rule.    After  practicing  the 
cue-based judgment under uncertainty task, participants were told they were members of 
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told that their rewards in the experiment would be contingent on the success of their 
group decisions.    Participants in the Majority/Plurality Rule condition were told that the 
location  endorsed  by  the  greatest  number  of  voters  would  be  designated  as  their 
collective  choice  by  the  computer.    Participants  in  the  Best-Member  Rule  condition 
were told that the best individual (who was most accurate in the practice session) among 
the  voters  on  each  ―hunt‖  would  be  automatically  selected  by  the  computer 
(anonymously), and that participant‘s choice would be designated the group choice. 
Costs for cooperation.  Costs (incentives for free-riding) were introduced as 
follows: First, members who chose to collect environmental information, when forming 
individual judgments, had to pay 3 yen.  Second, voters who chose to participate in a 
group meeting to express their preferences had to pay another 3 yen.  However, the 
payoff  from  the  selected  location  was  to  be  equally  shared  among  all  six  members 
whether they incurred costs or not.  The experiment consisted of 24 trials with 3 new 
hunts in each trial.    Before each of the 24 trials, each participant was asked whether he 
or she wanted to pay 3 yen for information search and whether to pay 3 yen to vote on the 
trial (these decisions were made independently).
６  Only individuals who had paid the 
information search cost could access the environmental cues when forming individual 
judgments, while those who had  not paid  the search cost  could not access   the cue 
information in the three hunts during that trial.   And, only individuals who had paid the 
voting cost were able to  express their preferences during that trial.  For each hunt,  the 
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Majority/Plurality Rule or the Best-Member Rule (the aggregation was conducted by the 
computer).   
Outcome  feedback.    After  each  of  the  24  trials,  participants  were  provided 
private feedback.    The feedback consisted of their personal net benefit earned during the 
trial (i.e., evenly split share of the sum of group outcomes from the three hunts minus an 
individual‘s own cooperation costs) and the number of group members who voted during 
the  trial.
７    Through the summary feedback, participants could learn how well they 
performed on the trial and adjust their cooperation levels  on the next trial.   Unlike the 
practice session, no specific feedback was provided as to personal accuracy. 
Results and Discussion 
Emergence of stable cooperation over time 
Our evolutionary simulation model suggested that group decision making under 
uncertainty  would  eventually  yield  a  mixed  equilibrium,  where  cooperative  and 
uncooperative individuals coexist in a stable manner.    Specifically, we predicted that 
participants  would  be  divided  into  one  of  the  two  behavioral  types  over  time, 
searcher/voter  hybrids  versus  non-searcher/abstainer  hybrids,  and  that  proportions  of 
these two types of members would stabilize.
８ 
Interlocked  information-search  strategies  and  the  voting  strategies.    We 
examined how frequently each participant showed the behavioral linkage between the 
choices of information search strategy and voting that we observed in the simulation.   
For this analysis, we divided the 24 trials into three 8-trial-blocks.    Figure 8 shows mean        Democracy Under Uncertainty      38 
 
proportions of the trials in each block, where participants‘ strategic choices were coherent, 
i.e.,  either  totally  cooperative  (searcher/voter  hybrid)  or  totally  uncooperative 
(non-searcher/abstainer hybrid).   
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 8 – INTERLOCKING BETWEEN THE TWO STRATEGIES 
-------------------------------------- 
Consistent  with  the  simulation,  mean  proportions  of  the  coherent  choices 
(searcher/voter hybrids and non-searcher/abstainer hybrids) increased over time, reaching 
nearly 100% coherence in the last block.    A 2 (condition) x 3 (block) x 15 (group) 
Analysis of Variance (using a hierarchical linear model) yielded a main effect for block, 
F(2, 52) = 36.52, p<.001.  This means that, if an individual voted in the last block of the 
experiment,  she  or  he,  with  probability  very  close  to  1,  had  also  engaged  in  costly 
individual information search.    Voting by ignorant members in truth-seeking situations 
(e.g.,  ―group  foraging‖)  would  be  self-defeating  in  terms  of  individual  net  payoff, 
because  it  would  degrade  the  overall  quality  of  group  decisions,  while  exacting  a 
personal  voting  cost  (Lupia,  1994).    If  members  are  aware  of  these  cost  issues,  a 
behavioral  linkage  between  information  search  strategy  and  voting  should  emerge 
voluntarily without social enforcement mechanisms in truth-seeking groups, as in the 
present experiment.     
Stabilization of  cooperation (searcher/voter hybrids) over time.  Were the 
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as predicted by the evolutionary simulation model?    Or, was the coherent-choice pattern 
due  to  the  tendency  of  uncooperative  members  (non-searcher/abstainer  hybrids) 
eventually  to  dominate  groups?    For  this  analysis,  we  estimated  the  theoretical 
equilibrium  frequency  of  cooperators  in  each  condition.  We  first  estimated  the 
empirical group and individual payoff functions by means of an econometric procedure, 
and then estimated the equilibrium frequency and the Pareto-optimum frequency for the 
Majority/Plurality Rule (see Appendix B for the estimation procedure).   
Figure 9 displays mean frequencies of the cooperative members in each group 
across the 24 trials, along with the equilibrium frequency and the Pareto optimum (local 
and global) frequency in the Majority/Plurality Rule condition.
９  Although the mean 
frequencies of cooperative  searcher/voter hybrids slightly decreased over trials, about 
half of members remained cooperative on the last trial.  Notice that the mean frequenc y 
of cooperative members in the Majority/Plurality Rule  condition was 3.13 on the final 
trial and was significantly greater than the equilibrium frequency (t(14) = 3.89, p < .001).  
Indeed,  the  modal  number  of  cooperators  across  all  groups  in  all  trials  in  the 
Majority/Plurality Rule condition was 3, with more than 75% of observed action profiles 
containing 3 or more cooperators.   Figure 10 displays the empirical distribution of the 
numbers of group members who cooperated (N) across 360 observations (15 groups x 24 
trials). 
-------------------------------------- 
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INSERT FIGURE 10 – FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF 
COOPERATORS IN GROUPS IN THE MAJORITY/PLURALTIY RULE CONDITION   
-------------------------------------- 
Notice also that variances associated with the mean frequencies, as depicted by 
vertical bars in Figure 9, decreased over time in both conditions.    Dividing the 24 trials 
into three 8-trial-blocks, a 2 (condition) x 3 (block) repeated measures ANOVA on the 
variability index revealed a significant main effect for block, F(2,56) = 8.02, p < .001.   
Thus, most groups stably functioned at a locally Pareto efficient level of public goods 
contributions, with 3 contributors and 3 free-riders per group.    The unambiguous modal 
value (Figure 10) is remarkable in finding a locally best outcome in group terms despite 
the fact that the individual incentives built into the game structure would predict far less 
cooperation at N=1 (see Appendix B). 
Did the stabilization in cooperation rates occur at the aggregate level or at the 
individual level?    That is, did different individuals cooperate on each trial or did the 
same individuals cooperate (and the others consistently defect) across trials?    Figure 11 
displays  how  frequently  individual  participants  cooperated  during  each  of  the  three 
blocks in the Majority/Plurality Rule and the Best-Member Rule conditions.    Since each 
block is composed of 8 trials, the frequency of cooperation (search and vote) during a 
block could range from 0 (a total free-rider) to 8 (a total cooperator).    As can be seen in 
Figure 11, the relatively symmetric distribution pattern in the first block dissolved over 
time  and  the  distribution  in  the  last  block  was  U-shaped,  with  the  100%-consistent        Democracy Under Uncertainty      41 
 
cooperators  and  100%  consistent  free-riders  jointly  representing  32%  (the 
Majority/Plurality  Rule)  and  42%  (Best-Member  Rule)  of  the  participants.    This 
indicates that, at least when individual adjustment is the basis for sorting into strategies, 
there is a trend towards polymorphic role self-assignment, with ―types‖ of individuals 
adopting different consistent strategies. 
Taken  together,  these  results  indicate  that  both  uncooperative 
non-searcher/abstainer hybrids  and cooperative searcher/voter hybrids persisted across 
trials, and that their proportions in each group stabilized over time. 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 11 – OBSERVED FREQUENCIES OF INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES   
-------------------------------------- 
Did the Majority/Plurality Rule outperform the Best-Member Rule? 
Given  that  the  rates  of  cooperation  stabilized  in  each  group  over  time,  we  can 
address our next question: Did the Majority/Plurality Rule produce better net benefits to 
group members than the Best-Member Rule?  Figure 12 shows that average per-trial 
individual net benefits were higher in the Majority/Plurality Rule condition than in the 
Best-Member  Rule  condition  across  the  three  blocks  of  trials.    A  2  (condition)  x  3 
(block) x 15 (group) repeated ANOVA using a Hierarchical Linear Model revealed a 
significant main effect for the group decision rule, F(1, 28) = 11.90, p < .002. 
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INSERT FIGURE 12 – MEAN INDIVIDUAL NET PAYOFFS 
-------------------------------------- 
How  does  this  pattern  relate  to  the  theoretical  results  from  the  evolutionary 
computer simulations?    Notice that the theoretical equilibrium frequency of cooperators, 
estimated  by  fitting  an  econometric  model  to  the  data  (Appendix  B),  was  1  in  the 
Majority/Plurality  Rule  condition  (see  Figure  9).    This  means  that,  theoretically,  the 
Majority/Plurality  Rule  should  yield  worse  (at  least  no  better)  outcomes  than  the 
Best-Member  Rule,  because  the  minimal  effective  voting  quorum  for  the 
Majority/Plurality  Rule  (three  members)  could  not  be  assembled.    However,  as  we 
observed in Figure 9, the mean frequencies of the cooperative, searcher/voter hybrids 
stabilized at slightly above three under the Majority/Plurality rule.    The minimal quorum 
(three  searcher/voter  hybrids)  persisted  in  the  experiment  and,  consequently,  the 
Majority/Plurality Rule yielded higher individual net payoffs than the Best-Member Rule 
(shown in Figure 12).    These results imply that behaviorally—although not predicted by 
theory—the  parametric  range  where  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule  outperforms  the 
Best-Member Rule may be much wider than that predicted by theory (shown in Figure 7).   
Even in cases where individual cooperation cost is theoretically too high to secure the 
minimal  quorum  (three)  for  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule,  observed  frequencies  of 
cooperators in each group often surpassed the quorum (Laury, Walker, & Williams, 1999; 
Sefton & Steinberg, 1996).     
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present research develops an explanation for the fact that human groups that 
engage  in  production  often  contain  a  share  of  highly  cooperative  individuals  who 
contribute to public enterprises at a cost to themselves, such as those who prepare well 
for  committee  meetings,  devote  substantive  time  and  energy  writing  a  joint  grant 
proposal, or stay on lookout to protect their village from enemies/predators.    It provides 
a principled alternative to the over-generalized prediction of the linear model that the 
only rational choice is to free-ride.    Recall that group production function in the linear 
model is often set arbitrarily by researchers.    For example, it is common practice in 
public-goods  game  experiments  to  multiply  an  individual‘s  contribution  by  some 
arbitrary number and then divide it by group size to determine a (constant) personal 
return from the contribution; and, this personal return is set to be less than the individual 
cooperation cost, regardless of the number of contributors in the group (Ledyard, 1995).   
Although such a linear model is a useful device to consider some theoretical problems 
concerning cooperation (e.g., effects of punishment; Fehr & Gächter, 2000), it is a serious 
misconception to assume that most natural group production tasks fall into this category.   
The analysis of the cooperate-or-free-ride, produce-or-scrounge decisions in terms of the 
Motro  framework,  with  its  plausible  assumptions  of  a  marginally-diminishing-returns 
group  production  function  is  conceptually  compelling,  realistic,  and  supported  by 
theoretical simulations and a behavioral experiment.    Our conceptual framework, based 
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in  natural  settings,  provides  a  useful  benchmark  explanation  for  realistic  levels  of 
cooperation in broad range of small group activities (McGrath, 1984; Steiner, 1972).    It 
also seems more convincing than alternate, somewhat contrived explanations that posit 
special sources of indirect utility satisfaction such as ―expressive functions‖ and utility 
derived from fulfilling ―civic duty‖, though these prosocial motives may be important in 
some cases (Brennan & Lomasky, 1993). 
The  insight  that  guides  the  present  research  is  that  group  performance  is  not 
necessarily  a  strict  social  dilemma  if  group  production  is  a  marginally-diminishing 
function  of  the  number  of  productive  members  (as  it  usually  is)  and  if  personal 
production  costs  add  up  (as  they  usually  do).    If  the  marginal  individual  return  to 
contributing is greater than its cost for some members (i.e., c < δm for some m between 0 
and group size), the equilibrium is a mixture of cooperation and free-riding.    In simpler 
terms, in most groups it is to the individual member‘s personal advantage to produce 
(contribute),  unless  an equilibrium  number of  other  members  is  already contributing.   
We  believe  that  group  decision  making  tasks  and  many  other  group  tasks  in  natural 
settings are of this type.  Perhaps most surprising of all, we found that experimental 
human decision making groups yielded a stable behavioral equilibrium at a locally Pareto 
efficient level of public goods contributions, with 3 contributors and 3 free-riders per 
group.  Finally, we found that majoritarian group decision rules have an adaptive value 
under uncertainty, and this result may explain why majority-plurality rules are popular 
across the full spectrum of human groups from hunter-gatherer or tribal societies (Boehm,        Democracy Under Uncertainty      45 
 
1996; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Wilson, 1994) to modern industrial democracies (Hastie 
et al., 1983; Kameda et al., 2003; Mueller, 2003). 
Our results are conceptually relevant to the long-term puzzle in political science 
about why citizens invest resources to become well-informed and to vote (e.g., Mueller, 
2003; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973).    In an election,  the cost associated with voting is 
personal and seems to outweigh any individual benefit that the act of voting can possibly 
yield.    Why would rational individuals bother to spend time and resources to become 
well-informed and go to the polls, if the chance of having an impact on the outcome of 
the election is virtually zero (―the Voter‘s Paradox,‖ Downs, 1957)?   
We should emphasize that there are several key differences between small-group 
decision  making  and  elections.    First,  there  is  the  obvious  difference  in  the  size  of 
electorate, implying that each vote is much more consequential in small-group decision 
making than in a large-scale election.    Second, most theoretical analyses of small-group 
decision making, including our own, have posited that ―common values‖ (Feddersen & 
Pesendorfer, 1996) or ―truth‖ (Condorcet, 1785/1994) underlie group decisions; members 
seek the mutually most beneficial outcome via group decisions (e.g., finding the most 
valuable investment, finding the truth in a criminal jury trial).    In contrast, a large scale 
election is a competition among several factions (e.g., parties) with disparate ideologies 
and  preferences.    This  difference  is  important  because,  in  the  political  domain,  two 
motives operate when each individual decides whether to vote or to not – free-riding and 
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(e.g.,  supporters  of  ―Candidate  A‖)  sharing  the  same  preference,  each  individual  is 
personally better off free-riding if a sufficient number of individuals are already voting 
for the alternative.    However, in the political domain, competition is also a motive.    In 
order for your party to win the election, you must assemble more voters than the other 
parties.    This competition factor is absent in our group decision making situation where 
members collectively play a ―game against nature‖ (Bornstein, 2003). 
In this sense, it remains to be seen how exactly the two decision situations relate 
to each other, both theoretically and behaviorally.    One possible extension of our group 
decision-making paradigm might be to have two teams of hunters compete for the same 
resource.    The team with the more accurate group decision monopolizes the resource 
and distributes it evenly among members on the winning team, as found in some political 
domains.    How cooperative will members be in situations where the competitive and 
free-riding  motives  conflict?    Will  a  stable  equilibrium  emerge  over  time?    Is  the 
Majority/Plurality  Rule  better  in  those  settings  than  the  Best-Member  Rule?    These 
questions  are  important  and  provide  another  test  of  the  adaptive  robustness  of 
majoritarian decision making under uncertainty. 
There  are  several  limitations  on  the  conclusions  of  this  paper.    Perhaps  most 
obvious  is  the  assumption  that  group  members  develop  individual  judgments 
independently  from  each  other.    Although  this  assumption  has  been  common  in  the 
previous theoretical work (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Sorkin et al., 2001), future work 
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conform  (Asch,  1956)  or  mimic  (Hung  &  Plott,  2001)  each  other  when  forming 
individual  judgments,  majoritarian  aggregation  could  be  subject  to  ―herding‖  effects, 
where  erroneous  information  cascades  across  individuals  to  yield  defective  outcomes 
(e.g., Anderson & Holt, 1997; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; 
Kameda  &  Tamura,  2007).    Because  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule  works  under 
uncertainty via its error-cancellation function (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Hung & Plott, 
2001), independence among members is a key contributor to its success (Surowiecki, 
2004).    One possible extension to address this question is to provide each individual 
(computer  agent  or  human  participant)  an option  to  mimic  another‘s  judgments  (i.e., 
free-riders who skip information search can mimic other members, rather than deciding 
randomly  as  assumed  in  the  current  model)  and  to  examine  the  performance  of  the 
majoritarian  aggregation  when  social  learning  is  possible  (Henrich  &  Boyd,  1999; 
Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002, 2003). 
Second, our results are obviously contingent on the distribution of competence 
among group members.    In the simulation, group members‘ modal judgment policies 
were  not  statistically  optimal  (Eq.  1)  but  were  based  on  the  suboptimal,  ―equal 
cue-weighting‖ (Dawes, 1979) with substantive variation;  members‘ preferences were 
thus affected not only by random error in cue perception but also by the systematic biases 
built  in  their  judgment  policies.    However,  if  these  modal  members  had  even  more 
deviating  judgment  policies  while  the  most  competent  member  had  a  near  perfect 
judgment  policy,  then  the  parametric  range  where  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule        Democracy Under Uncertainty      48 
 
outperforms the Best-Member Rule would necessarily become much narrower (Kerr et 
al., 1996).    It remains to be seen how and under what conditions the accuracy of modal 
group members‘ preferences, relative to that of the brightest member, can be guaranteed 
in naturally-occurring settings (Surowiecki, 2004). 
Third,  in  our  simulation  and  experiment,  group  members  had  no  direct 
opportunities to coordinate their actions ex ante.    However, if members are allowed to 
coordinate their behaviors in advance, they may eventually develop some social norms to 
produce more equitable outcomes within a group, rather than allowing some members to 
free ride on others unilaterally (Figure 11).    For example, such social norms may take 
the  form  of  turn-taking  to  bear  the  cost  of  cooperation  equally  among  all  members.   
Given  the  central  importance  of  ―inequity  aversion‖  in  human  cooperation  (Fehr  & 
Schmidt,  1999),  it  will  be  interesting  to  see  how  such  egalitarian  norms  and  mutual 
expectations (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Kameda, Takezawa, Ohtsubo & Hastie, 2010; 
Kerr,  1983)  may  develop  in  groups  working  on  tasks  with 
marginally-diminishing-return-curves. 
Lastly,  the  model  we  have  developed  in  this  paper  is  an 
evolutionary/population-level  model  whereby  ultimate  causes  (Tinbergen,  1963)  for 
cooperation in group decision making are considered.    It still remains to see how each 
individual actually computes costs and benefits of their cooperation in a group task with a 
marginally-diminishing-return-curve, and especially how they coordinate their behaviors.  
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begun to address these questions to understand computational algorithms for collective 
nest search by honey bees, collective navigation by baboons, and so on (see the special 
issue  of  Philosophical  Transactions  of  the  Royal  Society  B,  2009,  edited  by  Larissa 
Conradt  and  Christian  List).    Given  the  robustness  of  marginally-diminishing-returns 
group production function in nature (Foster, 2004), cross-fertilization between human and 
non-human  animal  researchers  will  be  useful  to  delineate  proximate  mechanisms 
underlying cooperation and coordination in group endeavors. 
We hope our methodology, starting with a description of the situation in game 
theory  terms,  followed  by  computer  simulation  explorations,  and  then  behavioral 
experiments is appealing to other researchers.    And, we hope that the virtues of this 
eclectic approach are self-evident.    Social behavior is often more adaptive and more 
rational than it sometimes appears at first glance.    Thinking about functional, adaptive, 
and rational properties of a system will often reveal a deeper structure that is not apparent 
to a superficial descriptive analysis (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gigerenzer et al., 
1999; Schelling, 1978).  The wisdom of crowds can arise from fundamental laws of 
social ecology that emerge from individually adaptive strategies (Surowiecki, 2004).        Democracy Under Uncertainty      50 
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Table 1.    Four behavioral strategies implemented in the evolutionary simulation 
  Participate in group meetings? 
Yes  No 
Engage in individual 
information search? 
Yes  Searcher/Voter  Searcher/Abstainer 
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Appendix A 
Implementation of the replicator dynamic in the evolutionary computer simulation 
We used the following formula to represent the selection process (Henrich & Boyd, 
1998).    Let us denote proportion of strategy i (= 1 or 2) in the population at generation t 
as pi
t, and its fitness outcome as Oi
t.    Then its proportion in the population at generation 
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where W is the baseline-fitness constant which is common to all strategies (we set W=30 
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Appendix B 
Estimation of the empirical group and individual payoff functions 
We describe a simple model in which the group‘s aggregate payoff as a function 
of the number of group members who contribute information has diminishing marginal 
returns.  For  analytic  tractability,  we  make  standard  assumptions  that  result  in  an 
objective function that rewards predictive accuracy by providing a fixed reward from 
which the squared error of the group‘s prediction is deducted.    Accurate predictions 
have smaller squared errors and consequently higher payoffs according to this objective 
function.    A priori, errors can be expected but are not known until ex post values of all 
random variables are realized.    It is straightforward to show that the resulting expected 
payoff  function  is  increasing  in  the  quantity  of  information,  but  concave,  implying 
diminishing marginal returns to information. 
  Consider  a  group  trying  to  predict  the  unknown  outcome  x.    Denote  its 
forecast m.    The group receives (in the aggregate) a fixed payoff B if its forecast is 
perfectly accurate (i.e., m = x).    The group‘s payoff, however, decreases as the group‘s 
squared prediction error grows larger.    Denoting the scaling of squared errors into the 
units used in the payoff function asλ, we can assemble the symbols defined above to 
form the group‘s (aggregate) gross payoff function: 
gross group payoff = B –λ(m – x)
2. 
Let N denote the number of noisy pieces of information that the group forecast depends 
on,  so  that  the  functional  notation  m(N)  describes  the  mapping  from  quantity  of        Democracy Under Uncertainty      66 
 
information into group forecasts.    Denoting the cost of information as p per unit, then 
the net group payoff function becomes: 
net group payoff = B –λ(m(N) – x)
2 – pN. 
In general, the best use of N noisy signals, (x +ε1), …, (x +εN), is to construct the 
forecast m(N) as the conditional expectation of x, which is very often assumed to take a 
linear form: 
E[x |ε1, …,εN] =α+β1 (x +ε1) + …+βN (x +εN). 
A  simpler  and  more  robust  approach  (in  the  absence  of  enough  stability  in  the 
environment to estimate the parameters in the regression) would be the simple average: 
  m(N) =   𝑁
𝑖=1 (x +εi)/N = x + (ε1 +ε2 + … +εN )/N. 
We now compute the expected value of the net group payoff function: 
E[B –λ(m – x)
2 – pN] = B –λE[(ε1 +ε2 + … +εN )
2] /N – pN   
= B –λσε
2/N – pN. 
Applying  this  function  as  the  group‘s  expected  net  payoff  function,  we  can 
examine the individual-level incentives for a single member of this group who is facing 
a binary decision of whether to pay p and provide one more noisy signal to be included 
in the group‘s forecast, or to free-ride on the information acquisition of others.    We 
assume, as everywhere else in this paper, that gross group payoffs are divided evenly 
among  all  group  members  (cooperators  and  free-riders  alike)  but  the  costs  of 
information  are  borne  individually.    Thus,  if  there  are  n  other  group  members 
cooperating in a group with M members in total, after netting out costs for the cooperator, 
the individual‘s expected net payoff is:        Democracy Under Uncertainty      67 
 
Expected net individual payoff for a cooperator = (1/M)(B –λσε
2 /(n+1)) - p, 
Expected net individual payoff for a free-rider = (1/M)(B –λσε
2 /n). 
The point at which the individual payoff curves intersect defines the so-called 
Nash point (see footnote 10): 
n* = - 0.5 + 0.5[1 + 4λσε
2 / (pM)]
0.5. 
At integer values to the left of n*, the strategy of cooperation maximizes individual 
payoffs even though some other members are free-riding.    At integer values to the right 
of n*, free-riding maximizes individual payoffs.    As intuition would suggest, n* is a 
decreasing function of the price of information, p, holding all else equal.    Also, n* is 
increasing inλ, because higher penalties for forecasting error increase the individual 
rationale  for  contributing  information.    Similarly,  n*  is  increasing  inσε
2,  because, 
when each single piece of information is lower in quality (i.e., less precise), the marginal 
returns from additional units of information diminish less rapidly, implying a rightward 
shift in the cooperator-free-rider cross-over point.    Finally, holding all else equal, n* is 
decreasing  in  group  size.    The  incentive  to  cooperate  is  present  for  fewer  group 
members, the larger the group is. 
  Recall that the expected aggregate net payoff function for the group is: 
Expected aggregate net payoff = B –λσε
2 /N – pN. 
We refer to the total number of cooperators N that maximizes the expected aggregate net 




Notice that the Pareto point is independent from the parameters B and M.    It depends        Democracy Under Uncertainty      68 
 
positively on the penalty for forecast error and on the imprecision of private information, 
and is decreasing in the price of information. 
  This  model  is  used  to  estimate  the  empirical  group  and  individual  payoff 
functions in the body of the paper.    The estimation procedure is as follows.    First, we 
estimate the gross individual payoff conditional on the reciprocal of the total number of 
cooperators in each group, 1/N.    The notation introduced here uses subscripts g to index 
groups and t to index experimental trials.    Because gross payoffs (before netting out the 
cost  of  individual  information  acquisition)  are  the  same  for  all  group  members,  the 
notation here does not index individuals‘ identities, although this is straightforward to 
add.    Using the definitions from above, any individual in group g receives an individual 
gross payoff in trial t given by the following expression 
individual‘s gross payoff = E[ygt |1/Ngt] = (1/M)(B –λσε
2 /Ngt), 
where g ranges from 1 to 15, and t ranges from 1 to 72, for a total of 15 x 72 = 1080 
observations that are obviously not statistically independent.    Because the same group 
is observed 72 times, the statistical model allows for within-group correlation of the 72 
error terms in the regression model, which affects the size of estimated standard errors 
but not the estimated coefficients.    There were only three observations in which N = 0.   
The model is valid only when N > 0, and therefore the regression coefficients were 
estimated  using  the  1077  observations  for  which  N  ranged  between  1  and  6.    This 
produced  statistically  significant  regression  coefficients,  and  the  following  estimated 
regression line where coefficients are rounded to the nearest integer: 
E[y | 1/N] = a + b (1/N) = 60 – 9/N.        Democracy Under Uncertainty      69 
 
This regression line is plotted in Appendix-Figure 1 together with mean values of y at 
each value of N, the total number of cooperators in the group.    It is straightforward to 
estimate expected individual net payoff for a cooperator and for a free-rider as a function 
of n, the number of other group members who cooperate, from Appendix-Figure 1.    For 
a  free-rider,  there  are  no  costs  to  net  out,  and  the  gross  individual  payoff  in 
Appendix-Figure  1  is  identical  to  the  net  payoff,  plotted  as  a  dashed  line  in 
Appendix-Figure 2.    For a free-rider, the total number of cooperators in the group is 
equal to the number of other group members cooperating: N = n.    For a cooperator, 
however, the total number of cooperators includes the others plus him or herself, and 
therefore N = n + 1, plotted in Appendix-Figure 2 as the solid line after subtracting 6 yen 
for the cost of contributing to the public good.  The figure shows that the two payoff 
curves cross strictly to the left of n=1, where n represents the number of other group 
members who cooperate.    This implies that cooperation maximizes individual payoffs 
when  no  other  group  members  cooperate  (at  n  =  0),  and  free-riding  maximizes 
individual payoffs as soon as there is at least one other group member cooperating (when 
n > 0).    Thus, any Nash equilibrium is a profile of binary actions in which there is one 
cooperator and five free-riders. 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT APPENDIX-FIGURES 1 & 2 
-------------------------------------- 
  Appendix-Figure 3 shows the empirical net aggregate payoff for groups as a        Democracy Under Uncertainty      70 
 
function of the total number of cooperators.    The points on this curve are empirical 
averages over 1080 observations of group payoffs and numbers of cooperators.    The 
curve has a local maximum at 3 and a global maximum at 6.    Thus, three is a local 
Pareto  point,  although  a  benevolent  dictator  aiming  to  maximize  aggregate  payoffs 
would choose the global Pareto point, 6. 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT APPENDIX-FIGURE 3 
-------------------------------------- 
In linear public goods games, the dominant strategy is usually to contribute zero 
and, if not zero, then the other boundary point of the action space (i.e., contributing the 
maximum amount).    In contrast, nonlinear public goods payoff structures can generate 
Nash equilibria on the strict interior of the agents‘ action spaces.    Our model‘s Nash 
equilibrium requires 1 contributor per group, which falls short of the socially efficient 
Pareto points of 3 (local) and 6 (global) contributors per group.    As shown in Figure 10, 
the data revealed a pronounced mode at 3 and showed that the groups we observed 
regularly  achieve  larger  aggregate  payoffs  than  the  Nash  equilibrium  predicts.    We 
found that groups stably functioned at a locally Pareto efficient level of public goods 
contributions, with 3 contributors and 3 free-riders per group.  The unambiguous modal 
value is remarkable, in that subjects find a locally best social outcome as a group that 
requires asymmetric action profiles among group members, without any mechanism to 
coordinate action.    The subjects in our study earn more by cooperating more than is        Democracy Under Uncertainty      71 
 
predicted from the individual incentives built into the game structure. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure  1.  An  illustration  of  a  marginally-diminishing  return  curve  (unit  here  is 
arbitrary)  as  a  function  of  number  of  cooperators.    The  y-axis  has  been  adjusted  to 
expected gross return to each individual (group gross return / 6).    An ESS is defined as 
follows  (Motro,  1991):  Cooperate  as  long  as  the  marginal  increment  (δ)  exceeds 
individual cost (c), but switch to defection beyond that. 
Figure  2.  Expected  individual  net  payoffs  (individual  gross  return  –  cost)  for  a 
cooperator (solid curve) and a defector (dashed curve), as a function of the number of 
other members who cooperate (derived from the gross return curve in Figure 1 with 
individual cooperation cost fixed at 0.7). 
Figure 3.  Structure of the simulated judgment environment 
Figure 4.  Outline of the evolutionary simulation platform 
Figure 5.  Equilibrium proportions of the strategies in each population 
Figure 6.  Individual net payoff at the equilibrium in each population 
Figure 7.  Sensitivity analysis about the superiority of Majority/Plurality Rule to the 
Best-Member Rule in individual net payoff 
Figure  8.  Interlocking  between  the  two  strategic  choices.    Participant‘s  behavioral 
choices of information search strategy and voting became more coherent over time.        Democracy Under Uncertainty      73 
 
Figure 9.  Mean frequencies of cooperative members (searcher/voter hybrids) across 
the  24  trials.    Vertical  lines  indicate  one  standard  error  (solid  line  for  the 
Majority/Plurality Rule condition, and dotted line for the Best-Member Rule condition).   
Empirically-estimated  Nash  point  in  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule  condition  was  1, 
whereas  Pareto  optimal  points  were  3  (local  Pareto  optimal)  and  6  (global  Pareto 
optimal).    See Appendix B for details of the estimation procedure. 
Figure 10.  Frequency distribution of number of cooperators (searcher/voter hybrids) in 
groups in the Majority/Plurality Rule condition across 360 observations (15 groups in 24 
trials). 
Figure 11.  Observed frequencies of individual strategies in the Majority/Plurality Rule 
condition and the Best-Member Rule condition.    Individual strategies could range from 
full defection (0) to full cooperation (8) in each block of trials. 
Figure 12.  Mean per-trial individual net payoffs (in Yen) in the Majority/Plurality Rule 
condition and the Best-Member Rule condition. 
Appendix-Figure 1.  Fitted regression line for individual gross payoffs (and observed 
means) as a function of N, the total number of cooperators in the group.    The regression 
model is E[individual gross payoff | 1/N] = a + b(1/N) = 60 - 9/N, for 1 ≤ N ≤ 6.    The 
mean of three payoff observations for N = 0 is plotted in the figure as well, although it is 
not derived from the regression model with the restricted range of N.    The model was fit 
with 1077 observations, and the coefficients were statistically significant at the 5% level.        Democracy Under Uncertainty      74 
 
Appendix-Figure 2.  Estimated net individual payoffs for cooperators (solid line) and 
free-riders (dotted line) as a function of the number of other cooperators in the group.   
Appendix-Figure 3.  Empirical net aggregate payoff for groups as a function of N, the 
total number of cooperators in the group (summing over 6 group members‘ individual 
payoffs after netting out costs for cooperation).    The curve has a local maximum at 3 
and a global maximum at 6.    Thus, three is a local Pareto point, although a benevolent 
dictator aiming to maximize aggregate payoffs would choose the global Pareto point, 6.        Democracy Under Uncertainty      75 
 
Footnotes 
                                                    
１  Laury  and  Holt  (2008)  provides  a  survey  on  the  economics  literature  regarding 
nonlinear public goods games.    To understand the motivation that has led economists to 
study nonlinear public goods games, which is very different from the present study‘s 
motivation,  it  is  helpful  to  recall  that  the  standard  linear  public  good  game  most 
frequently studied in laboratory experiments has a unique Nash equilibrium in which all 
group members contribute zero.    Thus, the theoretical model upon which most public 
goods experiments are based predicts universal and absolute free riding.    In contrast 
with  this  theoretical  prediction,  participants  in  experiments  usually  contribute 
significantly more than zero.    These contributions typically decline with repeated trials, 
but contributions remain well above zero even after as many as 60 rounds.    Interpreting 
this  frequently  replicated  finding  of  greater  than  zero  contributions  in  linear  public 
goods  games  remains  difficult,  however,  because  of  the  statistical  difficulty  of 
measuring  closeness  to  a  boundary  in  any  action  space  (in  this  case,  the 
zero-contribution Nash equilibrium).    At a boundary point in participants‘ action space, 
deviations can occur only in one direction; random error of any kind will push empirical 
averages away from their true value and the law of large numbers no longer holds.   
Faced with this statistical problem of measuring deviations from an equilibrium located 
at the boundary of the range of individual contributions, economists turned to nonlinear 
public  goods  games  as  a  mechanism  for  generating  incentive  structures  with  Nash 
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range of possible contributions.    This is the primary motivation for most of the existing 
experimental economics literature on nonlinear public goods (see Laury and Holt, 2008).   
In  contrast,  this  paper  reconsiders  nonlinear  public  goods  incentive  structures  as  a 
widespread  empirical  regularity  and  investigates  what  insights  they  have  to  offer  to 
psychology and the neighboring social science literatures dealing with social dilemmas, 
information acquisition, and voting behavior, concerning the commonplace observation 
of heterogeneous groups consisting of both cooperators and free-riders.   
２  In game theory, an evolutionarily stable strategy is a strategy that if adopted by all 
players in a population cannot be invaded (outperformed) by any competing alternative 
strategy (Maynard Smith, 1982; Gintis, 2000).    Suppose a situation in which a group is 
composed  only  of  individuals  with  the  focal  strategy,  x.    Now  a  question  arises 
concerning  if  such  an  all-x  group  is  robust  enough  to  block  a  small  number  of 
individuals with another strategy (y) from intruding into the group.    Does strategy x 
outperform strategy y in terms of average profit?    If strategy x actually outperforms 
strategy y, it can block y‘s intrusion into the group, analogous to biological ―competition‖ 
for an ecological niche.    If strategy x is dominant in this sense over all other strategies 
in the game, then strategy x is called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). 
３  Notice  that,  different  from  the  behavioral  strategies,  no  game-theoretic  aspect  is 
involved in member‘s judgment policy.    The theoretically best judgment policy always 
corresponds  to  the  optimal  linear  combination  model  (e.g.,  Eq.  1),  which  is  solely 
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policies in a group.    In other words, a member‘s judgment policy is not a strategy in the 
game-theoretic sense.    Thus, after being randomly generated for each group member at 
the  outset  (see  the  text),  the  judgment  policy  was  fixed  and  not  under  evolutionary 
control throughout a simulation run.    Elsewhere, we have discussed how such cognitive 
differences can affect qualities of group decisions under different aggregation rules (see 
Hastie and Kameda, 2005 for details). 
４  To illustrate, let us suppose that a group picked up a location with 36  resource units, 
where value of resource available at each of 10 locations had been generated randomly 
from N(0, 30).    Because each member of the 12-person group receives an equal share, 
this yields 3 resource units per person, which means that the total cost for cooperation to 
be subtracted from a cooperator‘s share, 0.03, corresponds to 1% of the gross individual 
payoff.   
５  N(80, 30) was used to generate resource levels in each location in the experiment, 
instead  of  N(0,  30)  in  the  simulation;  the  change  in  mean  value  does  not  affect 
uncertainty level in the foraging task because the standard deviation of the distribution 
was held identical.    The only exception was that both the true resource value (Qj) and 
the true cue value (C.jk) in each of 72 hunts during the experiment were held to be 
common  across  all  groups  in  the  experiment.    These  common  ―seeds‖  had  been 
generated randomly from the respective normal distributions (identical to those used in 
the simulation), for once, prior to the experiment.    This procedure was different from 
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generated randomly for each hunt by each group.    Given the much smaller sample size 
in the experiment (n = 3 hunts * 15 groups per trial as compared to n = 100 hunts * 
10,000 groups per generation in the simulation), making the value-generation procedure 
exactly  parallel  to  that  of  the  simulation  would  introduce  too  much  random  noise.   
Because  this  change  is  theoretically  trivial,  we  chose  the  current  procedure  for  the 
experiment.    For  each  hunt  by  each  group,  however,  we  newly  added  individual 
perception error terms (eijk) to generate perceived cue values (Cijk) as in the simulation.   
Thus, the cue values that participants actually observed in each hunt could be different 
from person to person.   
６  The total cost for cooperation (information search + voting)  implemented in the 
experiment (6 yen per trial) may seem small.  Yet, this was not the case because, as 
seen in Figure 12, it actually corresponded to about 10% of the average gross  payoff to 
each individual in the trial (see Figure 12). 
７  Our own experience tells us that it is hard to tell whether other members have actually 
prepared for committee meetings (e.g., engaged in costly information search), thus the 
number of searchers during the trial was not included in the outcome feedback.     
８８  It is important to note that the simulation and the behavioral tests involved different 
manifestations of what we think are the same basic principles of functional adaptation.   
In the simulation, an evolutionary algorithm determined the surviving strategies over 
thousands  of  generations  using  a  replicator  dynamic.    However,  in  the  behavioral 
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through which an adaptive equilibrium was discovered.    We believe that both routes, 
population  cross-generational  and  individual  learning,  yield  adaptive  behavioral 
strategies, but we do not want to obscure the differences between the two mechanisms 
(but see Campbell, 1988).   
９  The  equilibrium  (Nash)  frequency  occurs  where  the  marginal  individual  return  is 
equal to the cost of cooperation (Figures 1 & 2; see also Appendix-Figures 1 & 2).    The 
Pareto-optimum frequency occurs where the marginal group return is equal to the cost of 
cooperation;  net  group  payoff  function  is  maximized  at  the  Pareto  point.    In  the 
econometric  analysis  reported  in  Appendix  B,  we  estimated  the  equilibrium  (Nash) 
frequency and the Pareto-optimum frequency.    As shown in Appendix-Figure 3, the 
empirical net group payoff function reveals two Pareto-optimal points, a local maximum 
where the number of cooperators in the group is 3, and a global maximum at 6.    At 










































































δ5  If c <δ, cooperate for 
group production.   
 
If c >δ, defect. 
Figure 1.    An illustration of a marginally-diminishing return curve (unit here is arbitrary) as a function of number 
of cooperators. The y-axis has been adjusted to expected gross return to each individual (group gross return / 6).   
An ESS is defined as follows (Motro, 1991): Cooperate as long as the marginal increment (δ) exceeds individual 
cost (c), but switch to defection beyond that.    
Figure 2.    Expected individual net payoffs (individual gross return – cost) for a cooperator (solid curve) 
and a defector (dashed curve), as functions of the number of other members who cooperate (derived from 












































Number of other cooperators in a group
Cooperator 










Figure 3.    Structure of the simulated judgment environment 
Foragers  Environmental Events 
location j’s 
value,   
Qj 
 
forager i’s estimate 
of location j’s value, 













Proximal Cues  
 
 
At the start of each simulation run (generation 1), the prevalence of the 
two behavioral strategies, searcher/voters and non-searcher/abstainers (Table 






A twelve-person “hunting team” is composed by random sampling. 
   
 
 
   
Only  searcher/voters  engage  in  individual  learning  about  the 
environment  for  some  personal  cost.  They  can  access  to  the  three 





  Depending  on  a  given  aggregation  rule  (majority/plurality,  best 
member,  or  random  member),  the  group  picks  up  one  alternative  for 
hunting. The resource in the chosen patch is shared equally among all 
members.  For  the  cooperative  searcher/voters,  however,  the  respective 





Mean outcome (fitness) for each of the two strategies is calculated by 
collapsing their net outcomes (benefit  – cost) over 1,000,000 (=100x10,000) 




    Depending  on  their  mean  outcomes  (fitness),  the  two  strategies  are 
selected using a replicator dynamic, with the greater fit strategy yielding slightly 
more offspring for next generation.   
Population at generation t 
Sampling of a twelve-person group from the population 





































 Figure 4.    Outline of the evolutionary algorithm   





















Figure 5.    Equilibrium proportions of the strategies in each population 
Non-searcher / Abstainer  Searcher / Voter 
(a) Majority/Plurality rule  (b) Best-Member rule  (c) Random-Member rule 
34.74 30.48 27.87 25.96 24.44
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Figure 7.    Sensitivity analysis about the superiority of Majority/Plurality Rule to the Best Member Rule 





















Cooperation costs (search + vote)
Majority/plurality > Best

























































































Figure  8.    Interlocking  between  the  two  strategic  choices.    Participant’s  behavioral  choices  of 



















































global Pareto point 
 
Equilibrium point 
local Pareto point 
 
Figure 9.    Mean frequencies of cooperative members (searcher/voter hybrids) across the 24 trials.    Vertical lines 
indicate  one  standard  error  (solid  line  for  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule  condition,  and  dotted  line  for  the  Best 
Member Rule condition).  Empirically-estimated equilibrium point in the Majority/Plurality Rule condition was 1, 
whereas Pareto optimal points were 3 (local Pareto optimal) and 6 (global Pareto optimal).    See Appendix B for 























Figure  10.    Frequency  distribution  of  number  of  cooperators  (searcher/voter  hybrids)  in  groups  in  the 




















































Figure  11.    Observed frequencies of individual strategies in  the  Majority/Plurality  Rule condition and the  Best 
Member Rule condition.    Individual strategies could range from full defection (0) to full cooperation (8) in each 
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Figure 12.    Mean per-trial individual net payoffs (in Yen) in the Majority/Plurality Rule condition and the 
Best Member Rule condition  
Appendix-Figure 1.    Fitted regression line for individual gross payoffs (and observed means) as a function of N, the total 
number of cooperators in the group.    The regression model is E[individual gross payoff | 1/N] = a + b(1/N) = 60 - 9/N, for 
1 ≤ N ≤ 6.    The mean of three payoff observations for N = 0 is plotted in the figure as well, although it is not derived from 
the regression model with the restricted range of N.    The model was fit with 1077 observations, and the coefficients were 




































































































Number of other group members who cooperate (n)
Cooperator
Free-rider
Appendix-Figure 2.    Estimated net individual payoffs for cooperators (solid line) and free-riders 























Appendix-Figure 3.    Empirical net aggregate payoff for groups as a function of N, the total number of cooperators in the group 
(summing over 6 group members’ individual payoffs after netting out costs for cooperation).    The curve has a local maximum at   
3 and a global maximum at 6.    Thus, three is a local Pareto point, although a benevolent dictator aiming to maximize aggregate 
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